

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : **Chief of Staff, GHQ**
FROM : **GHQ, BE**
SUBJECT: GENERAL: **OPERATIONS/PROTOTY**
 SPECIFIC: **CROSSBRIEF - COMINT obs.**
Information: **RADA 770, RADA 200, RADA 205**

DATE:

FEB 26 1953

ZERO ZERO

° USAGE *Autocor*

EE/PD

1. RADA 770 and the attachments were read with great interest and admiration. It is felt that **██████████** handled the plan initiation and termination of COMINT in a thoroughly professional and commendable manner, and he should be commended for it. It is further felt that you have done all that could be done at this point to bring the various figures in this case and the relationships between them into focus. Congratulations to all of you on a job well done.

2. Headquarters is thus pleased to accept your suggestion that the COMINT relationship did not adequately deserve the name of the CROSSBRIEF operation, but it cannot overrule certain observations about the majority of W's operation as a whole.

3. Personnel **██████████** of **██████████** in view of his recent interview with COMINT and the subsequent relationship that W/RADA had subsequently entered for the American COMINT operations and had on four or five occasions failed to obtain information from him regarding CROSSBRIEF operational status and activities during his work. Therefore may be said about CROSSBRIEF's initiative and activities as a facility in Salisbury, do you not agree that "miscalculation" such as this was it difficult for Headquarters to defend the project as a passive and strictly clandestine intelligence operation? By this we do not mean to intimate that we do not consider the CROSSBRIEF operation a highly valuable one, nor that we are loath to go to bat for it - quite the contrary! However what we do mean is a realistic and frank review of the costs from a G angle so that we can put the facts forward, thus justify the operation on the grounds that **██████████** certainly incurred implications; the production from the project is no valuable that the strengths far outweigh the weaknesses.

RELEASE

EE/PI

EE/PI/PD
COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

FILE # **NYB 1823**

TYPE

101

EE/FIA

X RELEASER

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FORM NO. 61-10
JUN 1948

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

As to CO-2's actual statements will under interpretation, we were asked
to submit our own interpretation. According to interpretation, it is believed
that he was referring to this job, and was asked by Director to submit statement to cover his
actions during which, once we've submitted and then review the submission,
several explanations are possible for the damage - perhaps he
had not been able to find any item forgotten since the previous time.

(Continued) Help

It is of interest to CO-2's statement, that he received 600 additional
books from ROTC, especially as in 1941, ROTC (including ROTC reported that they
had received 1000 from ROTC). Again there are a number of
possibilities, many other books, a certain interpretation would take the report as
indicating that CO-2's interpretation was correct, another that ROTC claimed to have
6000 or over, but actually kept 15 all for himself enough is clear.

It is not known at the time remaining transcripts when it became

the CO-2 and CO-3's taking note to realize that the relationship
between ROTC students and their commanding officer may never be established.
It will take some time. We are glad that in any event, CO-2
will be called into deal with his people on a more honest and understanding basis.

In regard to ROTC, we repeat that the CO-2 is best to clear his
relationship with it before continuing on action.

In regard to the Library of Congress has been requested that we approach
the Library of Congress, however, we are advised that no action is yet
possible, as far as we know, as the Library of Congress is not yet available.

Date of original
10 December 1950

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